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APPROACHING “DANGEROUS” TERRITORY:  THE IMPLICATIONS OF DIRECTV V. 
IMBURGIA AND THE CURRENT SCOPE OF U.S. ARBITRATION LAW 
By 
Stephanie Lapple* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Law of Arbitration and the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”)1 remain worthy focuses of review before the Supreme Court in recent terms.2  
As exemplified in October 2015, the Court continues to grant certiorari to a variety of 
arbitration issues so that the substantive body of arbitration law can be more carefully 
developed and clearly defined.3  
In general, domestic arbitration law has widely developed since the inception of 
the FAA in 1925, primarily as a response to judicial hostility and resentment of 
arbitration agreements.  The history of arbitration precedent reflects that, for the most 
part, the Court has constructed not only a reliable alternative to dispute resolution, but an 
increasingly resilient and substantive body of arbitration law that emphatically enforces 
agreements to arbitrate, except where agreements are deemed unlawful on the 
increasingly narrower grounds under the savings clause of FAA Section 2.4  
This article analyzes the most recent decision by the Supreme Court reviewing 
arbitration, DIRECTV v. Imburgia,5 which is consistent with our current arbitration 
regime; the decision highlights the emphatic federal policy of enforcing agreements to 
arbitrate.  The nature of the decision, in that it consistently reflects this ever-
strengthening pro-arbitration policy, serves as an appropriate platform to review the 
current body of arbitration law and resulting implications to come. First, this article 
considers the history of the federalization of arbitration law with an additional emphasis 
on California decisions.  Then, this article provides an overview of Imburgia and implies 
that its disposition was foreseeable in light of the Court’s historically adamant 
federalization of the FAA. 
While Imburgia could be easily categorized as another anti-arbitration California 
decision that was predictably overturned, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is noteworthy 
                                                
*Stephanie Lapple is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
2 See DIRECTV, Inc., v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen 
v. AnimalFeeds, Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 566 U.S. 247 (2009). 
3 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
4 See 9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 333; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
5 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
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because she asserts that federalizing the law of arbitration has finally gone too far.6  
Justice Ginsburg defines the Imburgia decision as “dangerous,” and contends that, right 
now, federalizing arbitration law may be more important to the Court than assuring state 
courts are left without interference to interpret their own contracts based on the laws of 
the state.7 In more dramatic terms, Justice Ginsburg accuses the Supreme Court of 
prioritizing what appears as its obsession over arbitration law to the point of dismantling 
the autonomy of the states and stripping them of a principle upon which our country was 
founded.8  
Taking Justice Ginsburg’s dissent into mind, this article reflects on the rather 
negative implications stemming from the Court’s creation of the substantive body of 
arbitration law and how its current scope should be defined.  Broader yet pertinent areas 
to this discussion include a review of the original intent and purpose underlying the FAA 
in light of its expanded jurisprudence, the impact of the Roberts Court, and the specific 
effects of adhesive agreements on weaker parties, such as through “claim suppressing” 
and “boot strapping” arbitration. In addition, this article offers modern critiques of 
Concepcion9 to further present the increasingly dangerous scope of arbitration.  
Ultimately, the discussion of these various components, which have contributed in 
unique ways to the development of arbitration law, largely highlights that there is no 
exact reason why arbitration law has resorted to an utmost liberal policy.  Perhaps these 
components suggest that it may be time for Congress to intervene in what might now be 
an overly federalized policy.  Until that time comes, Imburgia will represent the current 
scope of arbitration law, which is defined by its emphatic federal policy favoring 
arbitration.10  Regardless of whether one considers its implications to be dangerous or 
not, arbitration’s far-reaching impact will continue to render its scope a noteworthy 
component of United States’ jurisprudence.   
II.   THE FEDERALIZATION OF U.S. ARBITRATION LAW 
A.  The Origins of U.S. Arbitration Law and the Enactment of the FAA  
U.S. arbitration law has undergone rapid federalization since the inception of the 
FAA.  The first uses of arbitration in the U.S., however, were laughable. Despite the 
current increasing trend in the magnitude and frequency of arbitration in the United 
                                                
6 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473, 476-78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
7 See id. at 473, 477-78. 
8 See id. at 477-78. 
9 Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
10 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
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States, arbitration law prior to 1925 was largely met with judicial hostility.11  Before 
Congress enacted the FAA, courts reluctantly enforced arbitration agreements and 
perceived them “as a way to force potential litigants to surrender their rights to a jury and 
public forum for the resolution of their legal disputes.”12  Judges emphasized their duty to 
protect weaker parties from forced arbitration proceedings and further justified their 
reluctance through common law techniques.13  For example, the “ouster doctrine,”14 
rooted in common law, was a platform upon which judges would refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements because the agreement tended to “oust” the courts of the judges’ 
jurisdiction.15 In contrast to the modern emphatic policy favoring arbitration, judges 
created “loopholes” by allowing losing parties to pursue remedies in court and revoke the 
arbitration agreement before any final award was entered.16  This led to the firmly rooted 
common law practice of not enforcing arbitration agreements and defined arbitration law 
as far from credible.17 
In time, businesses began to shape their need for a more serious platform 
underlying the enforcement of arbitration agreements and consequently pressured 
legislatures to overrule this common law practice.18  As a response to judicial hostility,19 
Congress mirrored the New York Arbitration Act of 1920, which was a statutory scheme 
for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements, to create the Federal 
Arbitration Act in 1925.20  The FAA bolstered the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
                                                
11 Lyra Haas, Note, The Endless Battleground: California’s Continued Opposition to the Supreme Court’s 
Federal Arbitration Act Jurisprudence, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2014) (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 
337); see also Salvatore U. Bonaccorso, Note, State Court Resistance to Federal Arbitration Law, 67 STAN. 
L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2015); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to 
Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 63-64 (2005). 
12 Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1149. 
13 Haas, supra note 11, at 1422. 
14 Id. (citing Richard C. Reuben, FAA Law, Without the Activism: What If the Bellwether Cases Were 




18 McGuiness & Karr, supra note 11, at 63 (explaining the function of arbitration within the business 
community); see also Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of 
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 460 (1996). 
19 Haas, supra note 11, at 1423 (citing Stephen E. Friedman, Protecting Consumers from Arbitration 
Provisions in Cyberspace, the Federal Arbitration Act and E-Sign Notwithstanding, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 
377, 381 (2008)); see also Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1149 (“Congress sought to eliminate this hostility 
through the FAA and make courts neutral to arbitration provisions . . . .”). 
20 See Haas, supra note 11, at 1423 (citing the law of New York in 1920 to show its similarity to FAA 
Section 2); see also Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804. 
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through incorporating Section 2, which provides that “any contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such a contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”21  
Although the immediate impact of the FAA was minimal and functioned for procedural 
purposes in federal courts,22 the Supreme Court has since built a well-founded decisional 
law promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements under Section 2 of the FAA.23  
B.  The Federalization of the FAA 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin Manufacturing Co. traces the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the underlying legislative purpose of the FAA.24  In Prima Paint, the 
Court addressed the jurisdictional issue, stemming originally from a question of contract 
validity, of whether courts or arbitrators had the authority to decide the impact of a 
fraudulent inducement claim on the parties’ pre-existing agreement to arbitrate.25  
Broadly underscoring Congress’ primary objectives underlying the FAA, the Court 
illustrated that Prima Paint was not a question of “whether Congress may fashion federal 
substantive rules to govern questions arising simply in diversity cases, . . . [but] whether 
Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to 
subject matter over which Congress plainly has the power to legislate.”26  Prima Paint 
provided an important framework for arbitration law by projecting that Congress “could 
create federal law where it had legislative authority to act,” and, through the FAA, 
“provide[d] [a] substantive directive[] to the federal courts.”27  In this particular diversity 
                                                
21 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
22 Bonaccorso, supra note 11, at 1151; see also Haas, supra note 11, at 1423 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION – NATIONALIZATION – INTERNATIONALIZATION 42-47 
(1992)). 
23 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. 
Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Rent-A-Center West, 
Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010); Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 14 Penn 
Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Volt Info. Scis v. Bd. of Trs., 
489 U.S. 468 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); 
Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Conklin 
Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
24 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 395; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 260 (5th ed. 2014). 
25 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402-05. 
26 Id. at 405. 
27 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 405. 
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action, the federal court was required to apply the FAA in line with Congress’ intent, 
which the Court concluded was to “foster the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”28  
The Court’s emphasis on Congress’ broad intent, however foundational for the 
substantive body of arbitration law, was restricted to cases involving interstate commerce 
arising in federal court.29  Prima Paints’ full implications and evolvement over time are 
reflected through a series of cases in the 1980s known as the federalism trilogy.30 Moses 
H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp.31 involved a contract dispute between a hospital 
and building contractor, where the Court considered the district court’s decision to stay a 
federal case pending the resolution of a parallel state action based on the Colorado River 
abstention doctrine.32  Importantly, the Court indirectly addressed the scope of the FAA 
insofar as a state court’s role in enforcing arbitration agreements.33  In holding that 
Section 2’s mandate was applicable to enforcing the agreement, the Court emphasized 
that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration . . . .”34  The Court also explained that the FAA provides basic rights to 
arbitration and suggested that all courts have a duty to enforce promises to arbitrate.35  
Subsequently, the Court more affirmatively defined the scope of the FAA, 
clarifying that this duty extends equally to state courts in Southland Corp. v. Keating.36  
The Court in Southland Corp. granted certiorari to address whether the California 
Supreme Court correctly held that allegations of statutory directive claims under the 
California Franchise Investment Law could not be adjudicated in arbitration.37  Focusing 
on Section 2, the Court expressly held that the FAA had a preemptive effect on state 
courts and state substantive law.38  In other words, both state and federal courts 
maintained a duty to apply the federal policy underlying arbitration law and the FAA.39  
The Court articulated a preference for enforcing arbitration agreements by emphasizing 
Congress’ intent to create a “national policy favoring arbitration” that left states 
                                                
28 Id. See also Byrd, 470 U.S. at 213; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 1; Moses H. Cone., 460 U.S. at 1. 
29 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 405. 
30 CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 268; see Byrd, 470 U.S. 213; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1; Moses H. 
Cone, 460 U.S. 1. 
31 Moses H. Cone., 460 U.S. 1. 
32 Id. at 13 (analyzing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)). 
33 See id. at 13-14. 
34 Id. at 7. 
35 Id. at 25-26; CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 270. 
36 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
37 Id. at 4. 
38 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14-16. 
39 CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 278. 
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powerless to require the judicial forum for arbitral disputes.40  The Court, noting that the 
California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute clashed with the FAA,41 
consequently promoted a national federal policy to thwart continued attitudes of 
hostility.42  Absent this national federal policy, the Court reasoned that hostility could be 
manifested through state law and forum shopping if the FAA only governed federal 
courts.43   
The final case of the federalism trilogy, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,44 
involved an arbitration agreement between a securities brokerage firm and customer who 
filed a complaint in district court alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Exchange Act) and other state law claims related to securities regulation.45  
Denying the lower courts application of the “intertwining doctrine,” which barred the 
arbitration of state law claims that were factually inseparable from the various other 
federal securities claims, the Supreme Court held that the state law claims were, in fact, 
arbitrable.46 The Court, once again relying on Congress’s intent, articulated that judicial 
enforcement was to be ensured over the “suggestion that the . . . goal . . . was to provoke 
the expeditious resolution of claims” by resorting to the judicial forum.47  It follows that 
the federalism trilogy undoubtedly outlined the emphatic federal policy of the FAA and 
“effectively federalized the U.S. law of domestic arbitration.”48 
The FAA has since maintained an expansive authority over matters arising out of 
international disputes and statutory law.  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., the Court determined claims arising under the Sherman Act between an 
American auto dealer and foreign auto manufacturer were arbitrable,49 and thereby 
integrated an international case into U.S. domestic arbitration law.  Importantly, the Court 
expressed that the parties did not forgo their substantive rights afforded by the statute 
under which the claims were brought while bound by the agreement to arbitrate.50  
Acknowledging the lack of any exception in either the FAA or the Sherman Act, the 
                                                
40 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10. 
41 Id. at 16. 
42 See id. at 15. 
43 Id. at 15-16. 
44 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
45 Id. at 214-15. 
46 Id. at 216-17; see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 280. 
47 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219. 
48 CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 281. 
49 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985). 
50 Id. at 628. 
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Court did not warrant any additional exception despite the establishment of antitrust laws 
and importance of the private damages remedy in the Sherman Act.51 
The reasoning of Mitsubishi was further reflected in Shearson/American Express 
v. McMahon, which examined the arbitrability of claims under the Exchange Act and 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.52  In its decision, the Court 
attempted to clarify when federal statutory claim acts may be inarbitrable.53  In doing so, 
the Court placed the burden on the party opposing arbitration to prove that Congress did 
intend to limit particular claims to the judicial forum.54  Since this holding, no federal 
statute to date has met this test to establish that a congressional intent exists to direct 
parties to a judicial forum over arbitration.55  Also, it is important to note that the 
McMahon Court acknowledged the difficulty of reconciling its decision with Wilko v. 
Swan, which previously held the Securities Act of 1933 was non-arbitrable and generally 
reflected the common law attitude of judicial hostility.56  The Court subsequently 
overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express57 and signified the 
supremacy of modern arbitration law when it held that Securities Act claims are 
arbitrable.58  Together, these landmark cases reflect the expansive shift toward a more 
authoritative FAA.  The decisions likewise demonstrate how the Court has rarely 
tolerated any grounds for deferring claims, subject originally to arbitration, to judicial 
forums. 
A history of the federalization of the FAA would be unfounded without 
recognizing Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior 
University, which has been deemed a setback in modern arbitration jurisprudence.59  In 
Volt, the contract at issue called for both arbitration and the application of local law in 
provisions describing dispute resolution and choice-of-law.60  The California courts 
denied Volt’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered a stay of the arbitral proceeding 
following California state law.61  Under California law, courts had the discretion to stay 
arbitration pending the outcome of litigation arising out of the same transaction or series 
                                                
51 Id. at 634-635. 
52 Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
53 Id. at 242. 
54 Id. at 227. 
55 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and 
Consistent Jurisprudence, 60 KAN. L. REV. 795, 843 (2012). 
56 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32 (analyzing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
57 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
58 Id. at 484-85. 
59 Volt Info. Scis v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. at 468. 
60 Id. at 470. 
61 Id. at 471-73. 
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of transactions involving parties not bound by the arbitration agreement.62  Volt shook the 
strong foundation of arbitration policy by upholding the parties’ clear contractual intent 
to have state law undermine the agreement to arbitrate.63  In other words, the Court 
emphasized principles of contractual freedom when it upheld that the Volt parties chose 
to be bound by the procedural laws of California in the choice-of-law provision.64  
Although the Volt contract was silent as to whether the parties made an express choice of 
law governing arbitration,65 the majority’s decision laid out a dangerous groundwork in 
its new doctrinal development by creating a basis for courts to employ anti-arbitration 
interpretations in the future based on freedom of contract. 
Nevertheless, the federalization of arbitration law has been strongly reaffirmed 
since Volt.66  In a 1995 case, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, the Court 
stood firmly behind federalization by thwarting judicial hostility.67  The dispute involved 
an arbitration clause between an Alabama homeowner and a Terminix franchisee.68  In 
sum, an Alabama homeowner, who originally kept the agreement in dispute, sold his 
home to another resident and transferred the agreement with the sale.69 The new 
homeowner eventually filed suit against Terminix.70  The Supreme Court of Alabama 
upheld the lower court’s refusal to stay the court action pending arbitration through its 
reasoning that any interstate commerce grounds for the original transaction became too 
tenuous over time.71  The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and held 
unequivocally that the FAA preempts state law when there is diversity jurisdiction, in 
addition to whenever a basis for federal law exists in state courts, and even when state 
law would govern the merits of the case.72  The same principles in Dobson were later 
affirmed by Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto and Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna.73 
                                                
62 Id. at 471 n.3. 
63 Id. at 479. 
64 Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. 
65 Id. at 476-77. 
66 See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 288-93. 
67 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
68 Id. at 268. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 268. 
72 Id. at 270-77. 
73 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681 (1996); see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 289 (explaining that Doctor’s Associates “added 
nothing new to the Court’s doctrine on arbitration, but confirmed the strength of the federalization 
development”). 
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The Court has most famously and forcefully curbed resistance to arbitration law 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, when it declared that the FAA preempted 
California’s Discover Bank rule using the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate 
arbitration agreements that contained class action waivers.74  Likewise, in three recent per 
curiam opinions, the Court “affirmed the now self-evident proposition” that the federal 
law triumphed over state law in the specific situations when two of four claims in a 
dispute regarding accounting practices were not subjected to arbitration,75 when public 
policy rendered an exception to the arbitrability of personal injury and death claims,76 and 
non-compete clauses could not be enforced under Oklahoma state law.77  Today, there is 
little doubt that the Court intended to build a strong substantive body of arbitration law 
after dispensing with many boundaries which would have prevented the federalization of 
the FAA as illustrated in these summarized cases. 
III.   CALIFORNIA’S RESISTANCE TO ARBITRATION  
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has blatantly reaffirmed its well-founded 
decisional law of arbitration, California courts have persistently rendered anti-arbitration 
decisions at odds with the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.78  This summary 
of arbitration decisions arising out of California sheds light on the disposition set forth in 
the Imburgia case before it reached the Supreme Court.  
Numerous California decisions have ambiguously portrayed the FAA to create 
exceptions and render arbitration agreements unenforceable.79  For example, in Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the phrase “involving commerce” under Section 1 and conclusion that the FAA did not 
extend to arbitration agreements in employment contracts.80  The Court relied on its 
liberal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements and the ejusdem generis statutory 
maxim to embrace a narrow exemption to transportation workers in employment 
                                                
74 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (invalidating Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)); see generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 24, at 291. 
75 See KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 566 U.S. 18 (2011) (per curium). 
76 See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curium). 
77 See Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500 (2013) (per curium). 
78 See, e.g., Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Shoyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007); Ingle v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Lopez v. Kmart Corp., No. 15-cv-01089-JSC, 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 58328, at *1-20 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 
2014); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005); Armendariz v. Found. Health 
Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
79 Haas, supra note 11, at 1428-29. 
80 Adams, 532 U.S. at 119. 
  162 
arbitration agreements.81  Similarly, the Court overturned a Ninth Circuit decision relying 
erroneously on the doctrine of manifest disregard to challenge arbitration agreements 
under Section 10 of the FAA in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., v. Mattel, Inc.82  
California courts often address preemption when interpreting arbitration 
agreements, as evidenced in Imburgia.83  Specifically, the courts have deferred to state 
law interpretations of unconscionability under the savings clause of Section 2 to avoid 
enforcing agreements.84 Through this process of “covert construction,” California courts 
have readily concluded that state law preempts federal law governing arbitration 
agreements.85  
The United States Supreme Court in Perry v. Thomas cautioned that state laws 
might be relied upon only if “they arose to govern issues concerning the validity, 
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”86  In addition, the Court 
expressed with regard to the savings clause in Doctor’s Associates that only “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied 
to invalidate arbitration agreements . . . .”87  This precedent did not provide the ground 
for California courts to rely on state law to interpret arbitration agreements disfavoring 
the policy underlying the FAA.  
Nonetheless, California courts have relied on a broad interpretation of this 
precedent to render arbitration agreements unenforceable.  For example, in Armendariz v. 
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, the California Supreme Court focused on 
unconscionability and expressed the concept of “mutuality” to hold that arbitration 
agreements must meet minimum requirements underlying due process to be 
enforceable.88  Three years later, the Ninth Circuit applied California law in Ingle v. 
Circuit City Stores to hold that there was a rebuttable presumption of substantive 
unconscionability in any contract to arbitrate between an employer and employee.89  In 
                                                
81 Id. 
82 See generally Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 567. 
83 See, e.g., Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473-475. 
84 See Haas, supra note 11, at 1432-33. 
85 See generally Daniel B. Mitchell, Note, Unconscionable Construction: How the Ninth Circuit Evades the 
FAA by Severing Arbitration Agreements as Unconscionable, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 303 (2012) (describing 
how the Ninth Circuit in Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 
2010), used the process of covert construction to affirm the application of California state law to an 
arbitration agreement). 
86 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
87 Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
88 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (the minimum 
requirements for an valid arbitration agreement included (1) no limitation of available remedies; (2) 
adequate discovery; (3) a written arbitration decision setting forth, however briefly, the essential findings 
and conclusions on which the decision is based; and (4) all the expenses unique to arbitration are to be 
borne by the employer). 
89 Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Ingle, the Ninth Circuit created its own rule of unconscionability by requiring mutuality 
of obligation in arbitration agreements.90  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the mere fact 
that an arbitration agreement existed between an employer and employee could render the 
contract one-sided enough to shock the conscious of the court.91  In creating this 
rebuttable presumption, the Ninth Circuit placed the burden of proof on the party seeking 
enforcement to show that the contract was not unconscionable.92  Ingle is problematic for 
arbitration law because it converted policy concerns for employees into an outlet to a 
judicial forum, and this ultimately reflected judicial hostility to enforcing arbitration 
agreements.93  Under the current law, the FAA strictly preempts this “brand” of 
unconscionability and was designed to overcome judicial hostility to arbitration.94  
Similarly in Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
relied on unconscionability to create a specific test for determining the enforceability of 
class arbitration waivers.95  The California Supreme Court considered Southland Corp. 
and reasoned that the United States Supreme Court “did not answer directly the question 
whether a class action waiver may be unenforceable as contrary to public policy or 
unconscionable.”96  Thus, the California Supreme Court developed a specific test 
declaring class action waivers were unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable in 
situations involving (1) consumer contracts of adhesion, (2) where the disputes 
predictably involved small damage claims, and (3) where it was alleged that the party 
with greater “bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.”97  
Discover Bank was applied in Shoyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. in 
which the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the savings clause under Section 2 authorized states 
to apply general contract defenses against arbitration agreements and held that the 
Discover Bank test applied to all class action waivers regardless of whether the 
agreement contained an arbitration provision.98  Likewise, Discover Bank was relied 
upon to invalidate a franchise-franchisee arbitration clause at issue in Bridge Fund 
Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., which held generally that state policies 
concerning fair business practices and unconscionability provided California a 
“materially greater issue” in deciding the case.99  
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A final example along this line of preemption cases is Preston v. Ferrer.100  In 
Preston, a California attorney tried to compel arbitration pursuant to a contract involving 
a law that vested original jurisdiction for cases arising under the California Talent 
Agencies Act (CTAA) in the Labor Commissioner.101  The California Court of Appeal 
held that the Labor Commissioner had exclusive original jurisdiction and that the FAA 
did not preempt California state law because it did not discriminate against arbitration 
clauses, but rather relocated original jurisdiction for all disputes arising under the 
CTAA.102  The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the FAA preempted 
the California law. This included any state laws seeking to establish primary jurisdiction 
in a forum that would limit the applicability and enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.103 
Concepcion is worth highlighting again for its direct impact on the Discover Bank 
rule arising out of California and for its force in overturning many California 
“preemption decisions.”104  After the California Supreme Court ruled that the class action 
waiver in AT&T’s contract was unconscionable under the Discover Bank test, the 
Supreme Court decided that California’s law acted as an “obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”105  According to the 
Court, this interpretation was necessary to preserve the power of the FAA.106  The Court 
also clarified that the savings clause of Section 2 “should not be construed to include a 
State’s preference for procedures that are incompatible with arbitration.”107  In theory, 
Concepcion limited California courts’ efforts to preserve access to the judicial forum 
through whatever “devices and formulas” the courts would express as contradictory to the 
FAA. 108 
In recent times, California has made veiled efforts to evade the emphatic federal 
policy favoring arbitration set forth in Concepcion,109 and this response suggests that a 
lingering bias toward arbitration remains in place.110  For example, in Iskanian v. CLS 
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, which was pending while Concepcion was decided, 
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the California Supreme Court found yet another loophole.111  The California court held 
that the employee’s arbitration agreement did not require the employee, as a condition of 
employment, to give up the right to bring a PAGA action under the Private Attorneys 
General Act of 2004 in any form, which otherwise would be  contrary to state policy and 
thereby unenforceable.112  Finally, Lopez v. Kmart Corp. is another modern decision in 
which California avoided arbitration.113 In Lopez, the Northern District of California did 
not enforce an arbitration agreement on the grounds of disaffirmance, despite recognizing 
the agreement as valid.114 
In conclusion, California courts have persistently refused to endorse the emphatic 
federal policy of arbitration law, even in recent times. The Supreme Court’s most current 
arbitration precedent is reflective of this clash once again.  The following section will 
discuss how the California Court of Appeal drew attention for its anti-arbitration 
disposition in Imburgia, which centers on what has been an important factor the Court 
has utilized throughout the federalization of the FAA: the FAA’s preemption effect on 
state law. 
IV.   DIRECTV V. IMBURGIA  
A.  California Court of Appeal 
DIRECTV customer, Amy Imburgia, filed a complaint against DIRECTV 
alleging unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, false advertising, violations of the 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), unfair competition law (UCL), and California 
Civil Code Section 1671.115  These claims asserted that the television service had 
improperly charged its customers early termination fees.116  Because Kathy Greiner filed 
a similar claim a day later, both plaintiffs jointly filed.117 Subsequently, the lawsuit 
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proceeded at the same time as a multidistrict litigation proceeding containing similar 
claims in federal court.118  DIRECTV moved to stay the action pending the outcome of 
the multidistrict litigation, but the Superior Court denied DIRECTV’s motion and granted 
the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification for some claims but not others.119  The 
decision was rendered on April 20, 2011.120 
The Supreme Court decided Concepcion on April 27, 2011, overruling Discover 
Bank and holding that, for the most part, class action waivers in consumer contracts are 
unconscionable and unenforceable.121  Consequently, DIRECTV moved to stay or 
dismiss the action, decertify the plaintiffs’ class, and compel arbitration.122  The Superior 
Court denied the motion and DIRECTV appealed.123 
1.   Relevant Provisions  
DIRECTV’s customer agreement for the acceptance of its programming 
equipment contained an arbitration provision (Section 9) which specified that “any legal 
or equitable claim relating to this Agreement, any addendum, or your Service” will first 
be addressed through an informal process,124 and then: 
[I]f we cannot resolve a Claim informally, any Claim either of us 
asserts will be resolved only by binding arbitration. The arbitration 
will be concluded under the rules of JAMS that are in effect at the 
time the arbitration is initiated . . . and under the Rules set forth in 
this Agreement.125  
There was a “Special Rules” heading governing Section 9: 
Neither you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims in 
arbitration by or against other individuals or entities, or arbitrate 
any claims as a representative member of a class or in a private 
attorney general capacity. Accordingly, you and we agree that the 
JAMS Class Action Procedures do not apply to our arbitration. If, 
however, the law of your state would find this agreement to 
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dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this 
entire Section 9 is unenforceable.126 
Section 10 of the agreement contained a choice-of-law provision, “Applicable Law:” 
The interpretation and enforcement of this Agreement shall be 
governed by the rules and regulations of the Federal 
Communications Commission, other applicable federal law, and 
the laws of the state and local area where the Service is provided to 
you. This agreement is subject to modification if required by such 
laws. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 shall be governed 
by the Federal Arbitration Act.127 
2.   Discussion and Holding 
The California Court of Appeal reviewed the Superior Court’s decision to deny 
DIRECTV’s motion to compel arbitration de novo and applied California contract law to 
determine whether the arbitration agreement was legally enforceable.128  The court 
affirmed the Superior Court’s denial as to the motion to compel arbitration.129  
In affirming the Superior Court’s decision, the California Court of Appeal focused 
on the interpretation of the phrase, “the law of your state” to determine the enforceability 
of the agreement.130  The court agreed with plaintiffs’ argument that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable because the agreement was subject to the CLRA—or the 
“law of [their] state”—which, at the time the agreement was created, followed Discover 
Bank and California state law that addressed the right to bring a class action.131 
In support of this conclusion, the appellate court initially emphasized the broad 
policy of enforcing arbitration agreements according to their terms as set forth by Volt.132  
Applying freedom of contract principles, the court distinguished between the ability of 
the parties to “opt out” of the FAA default rules under Ario v. Underwriting Members of 
Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, an option which placed the choice-of-law provision in the 
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arbitration agreement on equal footing with any other contracts insofar as its 
enforceability.133  In addition, the court cited the Discover Bank appellate court decision 
as an example of how California had previously held that parties may choose what law 
governs the enforceability of a class action waiver.134 
When interpreting the phrase, “if . . . the law of your state would find this 
agreement to dispense with class action arbitration procedures unenforceable,” the court 
contemplated if it was initially included in the agreement by the parties to mean, “the law 
of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any, of the FAA” or “the law of 
your state to the extent that it is not preempted by the FAA,” and chose the former.135  In 
sum, the court affirmed that that the reference to “the law of your state” provision 
provided an exception to the arbitration agreement’s general adoption of the FAA in 
Section 10.136   
Further, the court rejected DIRECTV’s argument that there was no inconsistency 
among the provisions that sought to apply both state and federal law, meaning the FAA 
broadly governed the agreement through its preemptive effect.137  The court reasoned that 
applying state law versus federal law in this case would lead to substantially different 
outcomes of enforcement versus non-enforcement of the class action waiver.138 Also, the 
court applied common law principles to determine that ambiguous contract language 
should be construed against the drafter.139  Thus, DIRECTV, as the drafter, could not 
“claim the benefit of the doubt.”140  Subtly, the court addressed the overruling of 
Discover Bank by Concepcion and iterated that the plaintiffs who filed their lawsuit in 
2007 were unlikely to anticipate that the Supreme Court would preempt Discover Bank, 
and, therefore, should be protected as the party who did not draft the agreement.141 
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Importantly, the California Court of Appeal noted that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis 
in Murphy v. DIRECTV, Inc. was unpersuasive.142  The court reasoned that Murphy 
provided no basis for concluding that the parties intended to use the phrase “the law of 
your state” to mean “federal law plus (nonfederal) state law,” and described that in 
actuality, a reasonable reader would naturally interpret the provision to refer exclusively 
to state law.143  Next, the court explained that Murphy also provided no basis to conclude 
that “contract interpretation is irrelevant because the parties are powerless to opt out of 
the FAA by contract,” and reiterated that choice-of-law would be enforceable where the 
law of a state governs enforceability of an agreement.144  This interpretation, in the 
court’s eyes, ultimately made the dispositive issue in the case whether the parties did, in 
fact, choose to abide by state law, or in other words, if the parties actually decided to 
submit to arbitration in the first place.145    
V.   THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION  
A.  The Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether it was consistent with the 
FAA for the California Court of Appeal to affirmatively answer the question of whether 
“the law of your state” included invalid state law.146  In doing so, the Court looked to see 
if this decision placed arbitration contracts “on equal footing with all other contracts” as 
emphasized in Buckeye Check Cashing.147  Also, the Court looked to the grounds upon 
which the California court offered to satisfy the savings clause and revoke the contract.148  
The Court began by recognizing that, in principle, parties by way freedom of 
contract can expressly render their arbitration agreements to the force of any type of law, 
such as the “law of Tibet” or as set forth in Imburgia, the law of California that included 
the Discover Bank rule regardless if it was invalidated in Concepcion.149  The Court 
reasoned that because the California Court of Appeal relied on state contract law 
principles to interpret the phrase “law of your state” as pertaining to invalid California 
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law, or California law under the former Discover Bank rule, the Court needed to 
determine if that use of California state contract law was consistent with the FAA.150  
The Court found that the appellate court’s interpretation of the terms “law of your 
state” was unique to the arbitration agreement and, therefore, did not place arbitration 
agreements “on equal footing with other contracts.”151  Because the Court of Appeals’ 
approach to interpreting the provision within the arbitration agreement did not adhere to 
the federal policy favoring arbitration, the FAA pre-empted the California court’s 
interpretation and rendered the arbitration agreement enforceable.152 
The Court employed six reasons to support its holding.  First, the Court reasoned 
that, contrary to the California Court of Appeal’s reasoning, the relevant contract 
language of the “law of your state” was not ambiguous.153  The phrase “law of your state” 
would ordinarily take the meaning valid state law, and not invalid state law, unless there 
was an express indication to the contrary or the existence of supporting case law, which 
there was not in this case.154  Second, the Court found that California case law provides 
clarification when there is doubt about how to interpret contract language.155  
Specifically, the law says that general contract principles in California incorporate the 
legislature’s power to change the law retroactively and preserve that judicial construction 
of statutes are ordinarily applied retroactively.156  Thus, the Court concluded that these 
general contract principles would have defined how to more correctly interpret the “law 
of your state” phrase for the appellate court.157 
Third, the Court found there was no indication from argument or precedent that 
California courts would ordinarily interpret the phrase “law of your state” to incorporate 
invalid California law in a different contract context outside of arbitration.158  This 
signaled to the Court that this was a tactic used by the appellate court so that it could 
specifically invalidate the arbitration agreement.159  In other words, the appellate court’s 
interpretation was not reflective of a general procedure all California courts use to 
invalidate other contracts.160 Fourth, the Court based this conclusion on the fact that the 
California Court of Appeal framed its question by focusing only on arbitration: whether 
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“the law of your state” means “the law of your state to the extent that is it not preempted 
by the FAA,” or “the law of your state without considering the preemptive effect, if any, 
of the FAA.”161  The Court concluded that this phrasing indicated that the appellate 
court’s holding was directed at the arbitration contract only and was not reflective of 
contracts generally.162 
Fifth, the Court reasoned that it was not likely that California courts would 
support the view that state law retains independent force, even after it has been 
authoritatively invalidated by the Supreme Court, and apply this view to general 
contracts.163  In other words, the appellate court would be unlikely to hold that invalid 
state law holds force as a matter of general contract principles, despite that it was so 
quick to conclude that invalid state law superseded Concepcion.164  Lastly, the Court 
focused on the appellate court’s reasoning that the “law of your state” constituted a 
specific exception to the agreement’s general acknowledgment of the FAA, but the Court 
explained that including the terms “specific exception” did not provide the express 
support that the phrase “law of your state” encompassed invalid state law.165  Moreover, 
the Court was not convinced that applying the canon construing contract language against 
the drafter, DIRECTV, was a sufficient reason to assume the result the appellate court 
reached.166  For all these reasons, the California Court of Appeal did not answer the 
question of how to interpret the phrase “law of your state” in light of general contract 
principles.167 Because the appellate court did not satisfy the savings clause of Section 2, 
the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the FAA.168  
B.  The Dissenting Opinion  
Justice Ginsburg argued in her dissent that the majority stepped beyond the 
acceptable reaches of arbitration policy and consequently set forth a holding that unfairly 
deprives consumers of reasonable protection.169  Focusing on the procedural history of 
the case, Justice Ginsburg first maintained that the 2007 version of DIRECTV’s 
agreement, which was at issue in Imburgia, blatantly allowed for the “law of 
[California]” to govern the enforceability of the agreement’s class action prohibition.170  
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This is because at the time the lawsuit commenced, the Discover Bank rule governed 
California law, which rendered class action waivers per se unenforceable.171  Justice 
Ginsburg emphasized that it was not until three years into the litigation and after 
Concepcion was decided that DIRECTV moved to compel bilateral arbitration.172  
Ultimately, the California Court of Appeal decided that the phrase “law of your state” 
meant “the law of your state without considering any preemptive effect of the FAA” 
because DIRECTV drafted the service agreement in a way to guarantee customers the 
right to unilaterally modify the agreement at any time.173  
The dissent’s reasoning portrayed that the parties could rightfully choose to be 
bound by a particular law of California even if that law was rendered invalid after 
Concepcion.174  This argument can be captured in the rhetorical question  “Why are 
parties allowed to be governed by the law of Tibet but not laws of the state purported to 
remain valid at the time they are interpreted?”175  In addition, the majority was criticized 
for its broad reliance on Concepcion, which the dissent explained “held only that a State 
cannot compel a party to engage in class arbitration when the controlling agreement 
unconditionally prohibits class procedures.”176  This meant that even after Concepcion, 
the parties would still be able to bind themselves under the California CLRA law as not 
pre-empted by the FAA, especially considering freedom of contract as emphasized in 
Volt.177  
Importantly, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decision is a 
“dangerous first” because the Court has not once reversed a state court decision on the 
grounds that the state court misapplied the state contract law when interpreting an 
arbitration agreement.178  Justice Ginsburg further frowned upon the majority’s 
unwillingness to embrace the application of a general canon used for contractual 
interpretation of construing ambiguous language against the drafter.179  This would have 
been a practical matter for the plaintiffs in 2007 who were unlikely to have predicted the 
Supreme Court holding in Concepcion in 2011.180 Additionally, the dissent purported that 
this decision runs beyond the scope of Concepcion and Italian Colors to the extent that it 
“deprive[s] consumers of effective relief against powerful economic realities that write 
                                                
171 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 472-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
172 Id. at 474-75. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 See id. at 473-74. 
176 Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 473 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
177 Id. at 474. 
178 Id. at 473. 
179 Id. at 475. 
180 Id. at 473. 
  173 
no-class-action arbitration clauses into their form contracts.”181  Thus, the consumers here 
lacked the benefit of the doubt even when there were legitimate reasons to protect their 
rights.182  
Lastly, Justice Ginsburg reminisced that the Court’s current understanding of 
FAA preemption no longer aligns with the main purposes with which Congress passed 
the FAA, particularly for specific business parties and to curb judges’ reluctance to 
enforce arbitration agreements.183  The dissent proposed that Congress in 1925 would 
have never anticipated that in the future, the Court would apply the FAA with such a 
preemptive force as to render consumers to adhesive contracts almost entirely 
powerless.184  Ultimately, the dissent’s portrayal of the FAA indicates that the 
federalization of the FAA has gone too far in its modern development.185 
VI.   CURRENT IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATION 
A.  Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent Warrants Additional Review of the History of 
Arbitration 
1.   Pinpointing the Original Purpose of the FAA 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent serves as a platform to re-analyze the history of 
domestic arbitration law in light of the Act’s original purpose, as compared to how it was 
previously portrayed for its growing federalized and pro-arbitration policy.  In the days 
before the Supreme Court recognized arbitration and its corresponding rights, American 
businesses sought arbitration to resolve disputes privately and as an alternative to public 
litigation.186 American courts neglected to enforce arbitration agreements and followed 
the English “ouster doctrine,” as mentioned previously.  The Supreme Court endorsed the 
“ouster doctrine” in 1874 when it held “parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary 
courts of their jurisdiction.”187  Precedents like this made American courts feel obliged to 
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follow the English rule founded upon the jealously of judges who felt threatened by 
arbitration in their own jurisdictions.188 
Consequently, the business community urged Congress to enact the FAA because 
of the advantages it could provide over traditional litigation.189  Overall, arbitration was 
less expensive than litigation and was an expeditious method to resolve inter-merchant 
disputes, particularly in the business context that dealt with perishable goods.190  In turn, 
removing inter-merchant disputes from court dockets freed courts and reduced court 
congestion.191 
There are further historical reasons to believe that the origins of enforcing 
arbitration agreements were pro-consumer, unlike what we see with adhesive arbitration 
agreements today.  First, the high costs of litigation between merchants were likely 
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, so this made arbitration more 
appealing to consumers.192  Second, the speed of arbitration likely reduced merchant 
costs and prices because the FAA served to conserve perishable food products and save 
capital in foodstuffs that would otherwise be wasted when dispositions from arbitration 
agreements were not enforced.193  Third, the arbitral forum saved tax dollars for 
consumers who ultimately paid less to maintain state courthouses flooded with intra-
merchant litigation.194  
It follows that, because of these reasons, a wide range of merchant associations 
endorsed the FAA, including, “fruit jobbers; wholesale grocers; raisin growers; poultry, 
dairy, and egg producers; peach and fig growers; canners; music publishers; and coffee, 
sugar, and lumber producers.”195  Merchants likewise supported the FAA because they 
reasoned that an arbitrator familiar with their industry would best serve their interests.196  
After many lobbying efforts, the FAA was enacted and construed to protect several of 
these ideals.197 
The original congressional intent underlying the FAA seems foreign when 
compared to the Supreme Court’s modern expansion of the FAA.  The text of the FAA 
suggests that Congress only intended for arbitration to apply to a narrow set of legal 
claims including inter-merchant contract disputes sounding in breach and maritime 
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claims.198  In light of the current body of arbitration law, little evidence supports that 
arbitration was intended for statutory problems, like antitrust, or complex legal issues 
stemming from statutory claims.199  Moreover, the aforementioned reasons underlying 
merchant disputes support that arbitration was especially more likely to cover “routine 
commercial matters of contract interpretation, breach and remedy” rather than consumer 
contracts of adhesion.200 
Nonetheless, several examples portray how the Supreme Court has extended the 
FAA despite the absence of support provided in the text or the legislative history.  For 
example, in Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court emphasized that the FAA reflects, “a 
congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements,”201 but 
considering the reasons upon which merchants lobbied for enactment of the FAA, the 
Court’s position is puzzling and evidenced by little support.202  
Also, the Supreme Court has supported the enforcement of adhesive arbitration 
agreements at all costs despite any indication from the original drafting that the FAA was 
meant to expand the way it did.203  Congress’s intent likely did not match the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, though, because of the obvious differences that currently divide 
consumer and merchant contracts.  For example, parties to business contracts “have a 
similar incentive to structure a neutral arbitration process.”204  This is because “each party 
bears a similar risk of being the plaintiff or defendant.”205  On the contrary, in a consumer 
contract, it is more likely that a powerful business entity would maintain a strong 
incentive to impose an anti-plaintiff arbitration process on a consumer.206  
It follows that Congress affirmatively could not have envisioned the implications 
that are reflective of adhesive, consumer arbitration agreements.  Modern consumer 
contracts are not formed from negotiations between parties with equal bargaining power, 
and this often renders the consumer powerless in the contract formation process and 
likewise in arbitration proceedings.207  Right now, consumers bound by these agreements 
lack so much power that they are unaware that their contracts include mandatory 
arbitration proceedings, or that by signing the arbitration agreement, they expressly waive 
their right to engage in class action arbitration against the business entity.208  Ultimately, 
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when considering the original purpose of the FAA and the ever-broadening scope of 
arbitration’s impact, it is unlikely that Congress envisioned such a “liberal policy” when 
it drafted the FAA. 
2.   Further Review of the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Precedent 
In addition to focusing on the original congressional intent of the FAA, further 
review of the Supreme Court’s decisions suggests that the Supreme Court has become 
somewhat lost in its own jurisprudence.  As Justice O’Connor famously put it in Allied-
Bruce Terminix, “the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional 
intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an 
edifice of its own creation.”209  This proposition has merit while further reconsidering the 
history of the Court construing the FAA to achieve a much liberalized policy.  
It should first be remembered that even after the FAA was passed, judges still 
displayed hostility and resistance to arbitration.  This is most evidenced in Wilko v. Swan, 
which held that claims stemming from the Securities Act of 1933 were not subject to 
arbitration.210  This decision was puzzling, and likely the result of lingering hostility, 
because the arbitration clause at issue was relatively clear, there was knowing and 
voluntary consent of the parties, and standard practices of the industry and expectations 
of the parties were evident.211  Similarly in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the 
Court held that the arbitration act was procedural rather than substantive and subject to 
the Erie doctrine, which had the effect of rendering Vermont law applicable to the 
case.212  
Following in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court began to warm up to arbitration 
despite its earlier doubts.  In 1967, the Court decided Prima Paint, and, as discussed 
previously, appeared to display a more favorable attitude toward arbitration by deciding 
that the issue of fraudulent inducement as to entering a contract containing an arbitration 
clause was reserved for the arbitrator.213  Likewise, the Court began to show greater 
affection for arbitration in the context of labor arbitration with the Steelworkers Trilogy, 
where the Court emphasized that arbitration was a critical component of the collective 
bargaining process in both United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co. and 
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.214  However, in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co., the Court in the mid-1970s evidenced concern for establishing that 
arbitration clauses had a broad scope when it held that a Title VII claim of a union 
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employee was not subject to the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement 
to which he was subject.215 
The 1980s cases promoting arbitration comprised the turn toward the modern era 
of arbitration.  The Court used pro-arbitration rhetoric in Moses H. Cone when it moved 
quickly to compel arbitration and reject the application of Colorado River abstention.216  
The Court relied on the notion that the FAA “creates . . . a substantive law of arbitrability 
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”217  While the 
FAA appeared to apply in state courts as well as federal courts, this issue was not 
resolved until Southland Corp.218  In Moses H. Cone, Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Rehnquist and O’Connor displayed their reservations about the Court’s zealous pro-
arbitration ruling, fearing that the majority decided too quickly on an order that permitted 
appeal.219  
Nonetheless, the Court subsequently held in Southland Corp. that the FAA serves 
as substantive law based on the “strong indications that Congress had in mind something 
more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in federal courts” as well as 
the congressional intent to create a body of substantive law applicable in state courts as to 
ultimately prevent state legislatures from “undercut[ting] the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements.”220  The dissent, however, cautioned that Congress had only intended the 
FAA to apply to federal court proceedings and strongly argued that the Southland Corp. 
majority may have embraced the personal preference for expanding arbitration rather 
than carefully considering precedent, such as Bernhardt, which viewed the FAA as 
merely procedural.221 The Court in Southland Corp. dodged Bernhardt completely, and 
the application of the FAA appeared not only inconsistent with federalism and states’ 
rights, but also with what Congress evidenced as its intent.222  Thus, Southland Corp. is 
powerful because it “appears to mark the beginning of an ideological shift in that 
Republican and conservative Justices, who might otherwise have opposed broad 
arbitration clause enforcement on federalism and states’ rights grounds, became 
arbitration advocates . . . .”223  In close cases today, there are no Republican-appointed 
Justices who oppose arbitration.224 
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Following Southland Corp., the Court continued to show its developing pro-
arbitration attitude in Byrd, in which the Court compelled the arbitration of state law 
claims and rejected that the claims were subject to litigation because they were 
intertwined with other securities claims.225  The Court took a larger step in Mitsubishi 
when it reiterated the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and required the 
arbitration of antitrust claims.226  Yet, the Court seemingly failed to find any basis in the 
statutory text, legislative intent or purpose, or public policy to support its holding.227 The 
majority explained, “[w]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying every 
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.”228  Two 
terms later, Justice O’Connor, who dissented in Southland Corp., led the majority opinion 
in McMahon, which was another important pro-arbitration opinion in regards to the 
arbitrability of statutory claims.229  This further evidenced the Court’s “emerging 
enthusiasm” for arbitration.230  In turn, Perry was decided in the same year as McMahon 
and rested on the criticisms of Southland Corp. that the Court’s enthusiasm for arbitration 
has sidestepped the protection of the states and the actual intent and goals of Congress.231 
Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Court has continued to display a 
zealous attitude toward enforcing arbitration agreements, but with some caveats.  For 
example, Buckeye Check Cashing and Preston are currently viewed as strong precedents 
upholding the emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration which demands utmost 
deference to arbitrators and the FAA’s preemption effect over state law.232  Although 
Hall Street Associates does not clearly indicate the Court’s preference for arbitration, the 
decision arguably can be considered pro-arbitration by the Court’s refusal to expand the 
grounds of judicial review under Section 10 of the FAA.233  
There is no doubt, however, that Stolt-Nielsen represents a disruption in the 
Court’s consistent renderings of decisions promoting the emphatic federal policy of the 
FAA.234  In Stolt-Nielsen, an animal-feed supplier sought to compel class action 
proceedings under a broadly worded arbitration clause that undisputedly bound the 
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animal-feed supplier and its opponent-shipper to arbitration proceedings.235  The 
arbitrators decided that the clause allowed for class action arbitration and stayed the 
proceedings pending the court’s review.236  The Supreme Court surprisingly reversed the 
decision and accused the arbitrators of exceeding their powers by imposing their own 
policy on the matter, instead of treating the matter as one of contract.237  
Stolt-Nielsen should be discussed for some of its underlying ironies. For example, 
the parties in Stolt-Nielsen are reflective of the types of business parties the FAA was 
originally intended to serve as two “substantial commercial entities of sufficient 
bargaining power to look after their own interests.”238  Moreover, it is ironic that the 
Court was suddenly concerned with whether or not there was sufficient consent to 
arbitrate when the Court had not considered the issue seriously in any of the decisions 
following Southland Corp.239  Thus, it appears that the Court was suddenly concerned 
with this issue when defendants, who were resisting arbitration, had slightly more 
commercial power and would be disempowered by the class action relief requested.240 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Stolt-Nielsen foreshadows her dissent in Imburgia 
because she suggested that the Court went too far in that it prematurely interfered in 
Stolt-Nielsen.241  The dissent criticized the Stolt-Nielsen arbitration panel for deciding 
based on policy, but indicated that the issue ultimately was “not ripe for judicial 
review.”242  It followed that the Court should have deferred to the strict limitations the 
FAA places on judicial review of arbitral awards.243 As Justice Ginsburg accurately 
pointed out, “[t]he question properly before the Court [was] not whether the arbitrators’ 
ruling was erroneous but whether the arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers.’  The arbitrators 
decided a threshold issue, explicitly committed to them, about a procedural mode . . . .”244  
Thus, Justice Ginsburg not only pointed out the Court’s inconsistency with its previous 
arbitration decisions, but further alluded to the Court’s fearless stake in shaping 
arbitration jurisprudence.  
Nevertheless, the Court reinstated its pro-arbitration platform when it decided 
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson less than two months after Stolt-Nielsen.245  Relying on Prima 
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Paint and Buckeye, the Court deferred a question about unconscionability to the arbitrator 
and precluded any judicial assessment of the broadly worded agreement despite the 
savings clause of Section 2.246  There is no doubt that in recent times, Concepcion should 
be coined the Court’s truest masterpiece in arbitration jurisprudence for its resilient 
position to enforce arbitration agreements at the expense of class action lawsuits.  
However, the implications of the Court’s achievement in reaching an undeniably pro-
arbitration jurisprudence can unfortunately now be viewed as less than satisfying for the 
specific reasons outlined below. 
B.  Understanding the Modern Scope of Domestic Arbitration Law 
1.   Defining Arbitration under the Roberts Court   
The Roberts Court has been accused of displaying a “tainted love”247 toward the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and, to an extreme extent, “represent[s] a new low 
point in the Court’s FAA jurisprudence” in terms of defining arbitration’s scope.248  In 
sum, various Roberts Court decisions can be construed as generally reflective of negative 
implications.  Three specific areas outline these implications for adhesive agreements in 
particular, which include (1) claim suppressing arbitration, (2) boot strapping arbitration, 
and (3) the critiques of the majority’s holding in Concepcion.  
a.   Claim Suppressing Arbitration  
Claim suppressing arbitration is a term that can accurately describe modern 
adhesive arbitration.  It underlines the motivation of employers who seek to include pre-
dispute arbitration within agreements in order to control and suppress future claims of 
their employees.249  For example, employers are motivated to keep “highs-cost/high-
stakes” claims out of court because these claims are presented in complex disputes where 
the liability payoff for the plaintiff is potentially high, and this justifies the plaintiff’s cost 
and risk in pursuing the claim.250  In contrast, employers seek to litigate “low-cost/high-
stakes” claims with the hope that litigation will drive up the plaintiff’s costs to the extent 
that pursuing the judgment is no longer justified.251  Perhaps the most obvious example of 
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class suppressing arbitration stems from the Court’s decision in Concepcion.252 Nothing 
appears to be more class-suppressing than banning class action waivers for individuals 
who would never realistically litigate their claims alone; the liability would far exceed the 
costs of litigating.253 
Claim suppressing arbitration has been an implication of the Court’s deference to 
the strong emphatic federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  
This proposition is first supported by the fact that strong evidence suggests that the FAA 
was not designed to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements in one-sided, adhesive 
contracts.254  The Court has repeatedly held that adhesive contracts are enforceable under 
the FAA, despite the fact that the original intent of the FAA purports to serve business 
parties of equal bargaining power with similar risks in the dispute.255  In addition, the 
Court eliminated the chance to observe any public policy type exceptions to the FAA 
when it overruled Wilko.256 Having this exception would have made it easy for the Court 
to address the issue of claim suppression throughout the history of federalizing the 
FAA.257  
This implication also adversely affects due process rights when agreements are 
rigorously enforced under the current policy of arbitration.258  First, due process is 
arguably affected when the “neutral arbitrator,” most likely hired by the employer, has a 
financial stake in the outcome of the decision.259  Simply put, an arbitrator is more likely 
to enforce an arbitration agreement because he will be paid more for seeing the dispute to 
its end than for rendering the arbitration agreement unenforceable.260  Second, it is 
arguably unfair to allow the wealthier and more powerful party (the employer) to 
completely control how the dispute will be resolved.  Therefore, the expansive scope of 
the FAA has not merely created an alternative dispute resolution process, but rather a 
deceptive tactic widely incorporated into modern business practice. 
b.   Boot Strapping Arbitration  
Similar to claim suppressing arbitration is the notion of boot strapping arbitration, 
which underlines further negative implications that derive from the current body of law.  
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Boot strapping arbitration refers to situations where parties of superior bargaining power 
insert unconscionable terms into arbitration agreements with the hope that a judge would 
be more likely to enforce them because of current policy underlying the emphatic 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.261  Boot strapping arbitration is recognized largely 
in the form of adhesive agreements and demonstrates inherent unfairness that exists to 
undercut consumers and employees.262  Similar to claim suppressing arbitration, boot 
strapping arbitration was arguably promoted after the Court decided Concepcion 
considering that class action waivers are now written as boilerplate language in many 
contracts.263  
The current arbitration regime has allowed employers to get away with adding 
several other types of unconscionable provisions into adhesive contracts in addition to 
class action waivers.  Six examples include: (1) unconscionably short statute of 
limitations periods, (2) limits on damages, (3) anti-injunctive clauses, (4) fee shifting 
provisions, (5) forum-selection clauses, and (6) non-coordination clauses.264  In sum, 
businesses have used arbitration clauses to trick parties into agreeing to unreasonably 
short statute of limitations periods and also to unknowingly waive their rights to punitive 
damages and injunctive relief.265 Businesses have also attempted to contract around pro-
plaintiff fee shifting provisions and have included forum-selection clauses in their 
arbitration agreements to pre-designate a court in the case of litigation.266  Lastly, 
businesses have employed confidentiality requirements to prevent plaintiffs from sharing 
information or costs among other plaintiffs seeking injuries through non-coordination 
clauses.267  These tactics are arguably a result of the Court’s tainted deference to 
enforcing arbitration agreements, which in many ways sits blindly to some of the most 
basic consumer and employee rights. 
c.   Critiques of Concepcion  
Concepcion has been widely criticized as a further source of negative implications 
that have unfairly fallen upon consumers and employees subject to adhesive 
agreements.268  Concepcion, as previously mentioned, invalidated California’s Discover 
Bank rule when it held that class action waivers were neither unconscionable nor an 
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acceptable grounds to invalidate an entire arbitration agreement.269  Professor George 
Bermann argued that the Concepcion holding is fundamentally flawed and inconsistent 
with the Court’s established decisions underlying U.S. arbitration.270  First, he curiously 
explained that if Stolt-Nielsen served its intended purpose, then the Concepcion decision 
was unnecessary given that Stolt-Nielsen evidenced that only express language in the 
agreement would subject parties to class arbitration.271 Importantly, Bermann emphasized 
that Concepcion invades parties’ basic fairness in arbitration agreements.272  Referring to 
Justice Scalia’s suggestion in the majority that the states cannot dictate whether parties 
subject themselves to full scale discovery or jury trials against their wishes, he made a 
valid observation: 
[T]he fact that the FAA does not allow states to impose pretrial 
discovery and jury trials in arbitration does not mean that states 
cannot override party agreements that would jeopardize 
arbitration’s basic fairness.273  
Concepcion blocked California and other state courts from guaranteeing this basic 
fairness to parties of arbitration agreements.274 Bermann suggested that the California 
Discover Bank rule merely promised to enforce class-wide arbitration if the parties had 
agreed to it.275  In other words, Bermann presented an alternative reading of Concepcion 
and suggested that perhaps the Court moved too quickly in Concepcion to write off 
Discover Bank, which could be alternatively viewed as valid state law.276 Consequently, 
this understanding of Concepcion sheds a negative light on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation and holding.  
Further questions and observations highlight that perhaps the Supreme Court, in 
rendering Concepcion, was more excited about expanding the federal policy rather than 
cautiously considering parties’ rights to arbitration agreements.  For example, why did 
the Supreme Court declare class action waivers per se unenforceable in Concepcion 
instead of allowing courts to analyze class action waivers under the particular facts on a 
case-by-case basis?277  Professor Jeffrey Stempel has asked, “[w]here does the majority 
get its . . . idea—that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental attribute’ 
                                                
269 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011). 
270 See generally Bermann, supra note 268, at 906. 
271 Id.  
272 Id. at 907. 
273 Bermann, supra note 268, at 907. 
274 Id. at 908. 
275 Id. at 907. 
276 Id. at 907-08. 
277 Id. at 908. 
  184 
of arbitration?”278 Consistent with claim suppressing arbitration, it follows that no 
rational person would fight for the $30.22 which the individual plaintiffs in Concepcion 
would have likely received.279  Lastly, Concepcion, in some ways, is a “blueprint for 
bootstrapping” because the holding risks “the ability of courts to hold other 
unconscionable contract terms unenforceable” by “holding that judges cannot use the 
unconscionability doctrine to invalidate a term embedded in an arbitration agreement.”280  
In sum, Concepcion is undoubtedly the high pedestal upon which the Roberts 
Court reemphasized the emphatic federal policy underlying arbitration.  However, 
alternative interpretations of its holding support the concept that the disposition has set a 
stage upon which powerful parties are further able to implement arbitration agreements 
fully to their advantage.281  These implications likewise will follow from Imburgia, in 
which the Court disregarded the use of what the California court regarded as applicable 
state law to interpret the contract.282  Arguably, Imburgia goes beyond Concepcion 
because it not only limited the consumers rights to the arbitration agreement, but also 
infringed upon the general protection that states are left alone to interpret contracts under 
their own state law.283  Altogether, Concepcion and Imburgia further legitimize deceitful 
business practices such as claim suppressing and boot strapping arbitration, and this is 
because of the adamant federal policy upon which the Roberts Court not only relies, but 
more expansively promotes. 
VII.   CONCLUSION 
Many aspects of this article have indicated that U.S. arbitration law is currently 
defined by an expanded scope, which underscores several negative implications.  The 
emphatic federal policy underlying arbitration has been further promoted by the Roberts 
Court through the new disposition in Imburgia.  By holding that consumers to the 
DIRECTV contract were subject to the preemption effect of the FAA, the Court 
effectively precluded the states from applying another method purported to protect 
consumers from the negative consequences of adhesive contracts.284  This disposition 
prompted Justice Ginsburg to deem the decision “dangerous.”285  After reviewing the 
Court’s history of ignoring what reasonably appears to be the original congressional 
intent of the FAA, further precedent that seemingly appears to stand on questionable 
                                                
278 Stempel, supra note 55, at 871-72.  
279 Id. at 868. 
280 Leslie, supra note 188, at 292. 
281 DIRECTV, Inc., v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
282 See Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 468-71 (majority opinion). 
283 See id. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
284 See id. at 471. 
285 Id. at 471-78.  
  185 
grounds, and the modern use of adhesive contracts, there are reasons to conclude that 
Justice Ginsburg correctly described the current state of domestic arbitration. 
Another conclusion, although frustrating, is that it is difficult to pinpoint the exact 
reason why the Supreme Court has insisted on creating the emphatic federal policy 
underlying the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  While this article has explored 
many areas including the history of federalization—from Congress’ narrowed intent to 
pass the FAA for merchant disputes to the Court’s response to California’s continued 
resistance to the FAA or perhaps the Court’s mere infatuation with arbitration by itself—
the answer still remains unclear in light of Imburgia.  Nonetheless, the many implications 
discussed in this article affirmatively support the conclusion that Imburgia provides the 
necessary platform upon which one can re-examine and define the current scope of 
arbitration.  
All things considered, so long as precedent such as Imburgia will define the 
current scope of arbitration jurisprudence, alternative legislation might be the only option 
to prevent the aforementioned dangerous implications of arbitration.  Until that day 
comes, Imburgia stands tall as the legitimate defender of Court’s emphatic federal policy, 
and regardless of potentially negative implications, its far-reaching consequences and 
definitive scope will continue to affect many under its expansive regime.
